Spectrum coordination represents a paradigm shift in both radio and networking technologies, with the potential to provide major gains in operational costs and spectral efficiency. A major challenge when introducing multi-vendors/multi-standard wireless networks/devices -running different physical and link layer protocols -is to figure out how they fit and work together under realistic conditions. These entities coordinate the spectrum, either in a centralized manner or in an arbitrary manner. However, the desired autonomous feature of future wireless systems makes the use of a central authority for spectrum management less appealing. Furthermore, an arbitrary manner results in poor performance for some networks and sub-optimal performance in aggregate. To overcome these operational challenges among others, that the introduction of future generations of LTE imposes on the spectrum management, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the power control problem where transmitters jointly choose their channel assignment and power control in order to maximize their individual energy efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ecological concerns are steadily attracting more and more attention in wireless communications [1] . Innovative solutions that support traffic increase and maintain a limited energy consumption need to be considered at both system and device levels, in order to address environmental and operational costs. To do so, we propose to study energy efficient wireless protocols in which we introduce a degree of hierarchy between users and show how this can naturally lead to a spectrum coordination pattern where users have incentive to transmit over different carriers. We formally prove that the hierarchical structure of the game induces a spectrum coordination between the different components of the network in such a way that they transmit on distinct carriers. This coordination feature across the multiple interfering devices is particularly appealing, not only from an interworking perspective (as a result of reduced infrastructure), but also for increasing both network coverage and data capacity without the need to split the available spectrum. As an example, in a heterogeneous networks, the coordination between macro cells and small cells can increase capacity in the order of 2 to 10 times through spectrum reuse across layers and radio coordination functionality [2] .
More specifically, we consider energy efficient multi-carrier wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel. The network is said to be decentralized in the sense that each user can freely choose his power control policy in order to selfishly maximize a certain individual performance criterion, called utility (or payoff) in the context of game theoretic studies. In a prior work [3] , we proposed a hierarchical game theoretic model for two-user-two-carrier energy efficient wireless systems. IIt was shown that, for the vast majority of cases, users choose their transmitting carriers in such a way that if the leader transmits on a given carrier, the follower has incentive to choose the other carrier. One major motivation of this paper is to extend the original problem in [3] to some general models that can be widely used in practice assuming an arbitrary number of carriers. Indeed, it has been shown in [4] that the optimal energy efficiency requires both the diversity and the multiplexing gains be exploited. The multi-dimensional nature of such a problem along with the physical properties of the transmission phenomenon make the extension to an arbitrary number of carriers problem much more challenging than the two-carrier model. We prove that the advantage of the hierarchical model that we propose over the simultaneous-move model in [5] will be rather significant. We show that the coordination feature makes correlation over carriers very suitable for energy efficient systems as it brings more coordination over the system (and thus leads to higher spectral efficiency), while correlation over users is not suited as it degrades the spectral efficiency. We further provide tight bounds on the probability of no coordination and the spectral efficiency.
In the literature, energy efficient power control game has been first proposed by Goodman et al. in [6] for flat fading channels and re-used by [5] and [7] for multi-carrier code-division multiple access (CDMA) systems, [8] for relay-assisted DS/CDMA and [9] for orthogonal frequencydivision multiple access (OFDMA) communication systems. All these works do not consider hierarchy among different actors in the system. However, as mentioned in [6] the Nash equilibrium (NE) in such games can be very energy inefficient. In addition, [10] showed that the optimal transmit power which minimizes the overall energy consumption depends on the network topology.
Note that the Stackelberg formulation arises naturally in many context of practical interest. For example, the hierarchy is inherent to cognitive radio networks where the user with the higher priority (i.e., the leader or PU) transmits first, then the user with the lower priority (i.e., the follower or SU) transmits after sensing the spectral environment [11] , [12] . This is also a natural setting for heterogeneous wireless networks due to the absence of coordination among the small cells, and between small cells and macro cells [13] - [15] . There have been many works on Stackelberg games, even in the context of cognitive radio [16] , but they do not consider energy-efficiency for the individual utility as defined in [6] . They rather consider transmission rate-type utilities (see e.g., [17] - [19] ).
In the light of the above, the paper is structured as follows. The general system model is presented in Sec. II and Sec. III defines the energy efficiency framework. Sec. IV reviews the noncooperative game and presents the hierarchical game problem. Then, in Sec. V, we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium, and we evaluate the performance of the Stackelberg approach in Sec VI. Sec. VII provide numerical results to illustrate and validate the theoretical results derived in the previous sections. Additional comments and conclusions are provided in Sec. VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a decentralized multiple access channel composed of a leader -indexed by 1, having the priority to access the medium, and a follower -indexed by 2 that accesses the medium after observing the action of the leader. We assume the overall bandwidth is W can be divided into an arbitrary number of narrow-band carriers (K ≥ 2), the subcarrier is narrow enough to undergo flat fading, and the channel gain is quasi-static fading for which the channels are constant within a given time slot but change independently from one slot to another. Without the constraint of exclusive assignment of each carrier for users, we generally formulate the problem of energy efficiency maximization by allowing that a carrier could be shared by both users. Accordingly, for any user n ∈ {1, 2}, the received signal-to-noise plus interference ratio (SINR) is expressed as
We will call h k n the effective channel gain, defined as the ratio between the SINR and the transmission power for the users over the k th carrier. g k n and p k n are resp. the fading channel gain and the power control of user n transmitting on carrier k, whereas σ 2 stands for the variance of the Gaussian noise. We statistically model the channel gains g k n to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the Rayleigh fading coefficients. It follows from the above SINR expression that the strategy chosen by a user affects the performance of other users in the network through multiple-access interference.
III. NETWORK ENERGY-EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
The system model adopted throughout the paper is based on the seminal paper [6] that defines the energy efficiency framework. The energy efficiency can be concisely captured by an increasing, continuous and S-shaped "efficiency" function f (·) which measures the packet success rate. A more detailed discussion of the efficiency function can be found in [20] . The following utility function allows one to measure the corresponding tradeoff between the transmission benefit (total throughput over the K carriers) and cost (total power over the K carriers):
where R n is the transmission rate of user n and p n is the power allocation vector of user n over all carriers, i.e., p n = (p 1 n , . . . , p K n ). The utility function u n , that has bits per joule as units, perfectly captures the tradeoff between throughput and battery life and is particularly suitable for applications where energy efficiency is crucial.
IV. THE GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
A. The simultaneous-move game problem
An important solution concept of the game under consideration is the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is a fundamental concept in non-cooperative strategic games. It is a vector of strategies (referred to hereafter and interchangeably as actions), one for each player,
such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change his strategy. If there exists an > 0 such
B. The hierarchical game formulation
Hierarchical models in wireless networks are motivated by the idea that the utility of the leader obtained at the Stackelberg equilibrium can often be improved over his utility obtained at the Nash equilibrium when the two users play simultaneously. It has been proved in [21] , that, when only one carrier is available for the players, there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium 2 in which both the leader and the follower improve their utilities. The goal is then to find a Stackelberg equilibrium in this bi-level game [22] .
In this work, we consider a Stackelberg game framework in which, a foresighted follower adapts his power allocation vector p 2 , based on the power vector of the leader p 1 in advance. The power allocation of the shortsighted leader will re-embody in the form of interference introduced to the foresighted follower as given by Eq. (2) . At the core lies the idea that, the foresighted follower will extract the useful asymmetry information in order to make more efficient hierarchical decision making. We shall characterize the best-response function of the users by using a result from [5] .
Definition 1. (Stackelberg equilibrium):
A vector of actions p = (
is called Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) if and only if:
where for all p 1 , we have
and p 2 = p 2 ( p 1 ).
V. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
A. Review of the follower's power allocation vector
We first determine the best-response function of the follower depending on the action of the leader. This result comes directly from Proposition 1 of [5] . For making this paper sufficiently self-contained, we review here the latter proposition. 1 The −n subscript on vector p stands for "except user n".
2 a Nash equilibrium in game with hierarchy. We will introduce this concept more formally later in the paper. Proposition 1. Given the power allocation vector p 1 of the leader, the best-response of the follower is given by
with
and γ * is the unique (positive) solution of the first order equation
Note that Eq. (4) has a unique solution if the efficiency function f (·) is sigmoidal [23] . The last proposition says that the best-response of the follower is to use only one carrier, the one such that the effective channel gain is the best.
B. Characterization of the leader's power allocation vector
Let us first present a result that will allow us to characterize the equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 2. Denote by B 1 and S 1 two carriers for the leader for which g k 1 is the highest and the second highest respectively, while by B 2 and S 2 the ones with two highest g k 2 (that is, for the follower). If the Stackelberg game has an equilibrium, then it has an equilibrium where the leader transmits over one of the carriers {B 1 , S 1 }, while the follower transmits over one of the carriers
For the clarity of the exposition, all the propositions are proven in the Appendix.
Given this result, we may only concentrate on strategies where each of the players uses one of his two best carriers. The proposition below gives the algorithm to compute the equilibrium power allocations for both players. Before the proposition we introduce additional notation:
. Proposition 3. If B 1 = B 2 then equilibrium power allocation of each of the players is
If B 1 = B 2 then the equilibrium power allocations of the players are computed in three steps:
1) Ifγ ≤ γ * then equilibrium power allocation of the leader is
0 otherwise and that of the follower is
Else go to steps 2 and 3.
2) Find all the solutions x ≤γ 1+γ * (1+γ) to the equation
If there are solutions different than x = 0, choose the one for which
is the highest.
Let β * be this solution.
3) Compare four values 3 :
If V B 1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocations of the leader and the follower are
Next, if W B 1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocations of the leader and the follower are
If U S 1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocation of the leader is
and that of the follower is
is (the only) greatest, then the game has no equilibrium.
This result differs from what it is usually obtained by capacity-based systems in two main points:
• It is well known that capacity-based approaches lead to a water-filling solution [24] where more power is allocated if channel is good and less power is allocated if the channel is bad.
Inversely, Prop. 3 states that, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, energy efficient-based approaches lead to a channel inversion power allocation in which more, resp. less, power is allocated when the channel is bad, resp. good to compensate for fading channel,
• Prop. 3 also claims that, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, the two actors of the system use only one carrier depending on their fading channel gains. Again, this contrasts with capacitybased approaches in which only a certain number of carriers are exploited depending on the channel gains. In particular, when the SNR is low, resp. high, only one, resp. every, carrier is exploited. Energy efficiency, on the other hand, is always maximized by using a single carrier. This means that each of the users always leaves K − 1 carriers completely idle. to an equilibrium strategy of the leader, the follower has no incentive to follow his equilibrium policy. In our case the equilibrium strategy can be imposed to the follower when he has multiple best responses to the leader's policy by using a simple trick: whenever W B 1 appears to be the greatest in step 3), the leader has to use power infinitesimally smaller than that prescribed by his equilibrium policy. This gives him a minimally smaller utility, but at the same time makes the best response of the follower unique.
The next proposition characterizes the degenerate case when there is no equilibrium in the Stackelberg game.
the Stackelberg game has no equilibrium, but for any > 0 there are -equilibria of the form
for the leader and
for the follower, where α( ) is an arbitrarily small value, guaranteing that the utility of the leader
It is important to notice that the case considered in Proposition 4 is indeed possible for some sigmoidal function f . One example of such f is one of the form:
One can check that f is concave on interval [0, 3 4 ] and convex on [ , so it is definitely a sigmoidal function. It is straightforward to compute that γ * = 1 for this function. Unfortunately, the equation (5) has no solutions on (0, ∞), which can be computed either numerically or using Taylor expansion of the function
, and so for g
2 and g
, the inequality (6) will be satisfied.
On the other hand, any of the two following assumptions:
implies that (6) is never satisfied, and so the game under consideration always has an equilibrium.
In particular, for the most standard form of f [5] ,
not only there always exists an equilibrium in the Stackelberg model (because f satisfies (A1)), but also the procedure in Proposition 3 slightly simplifies, as:
2) Eq. (5) can be written as M (x − x 2 γ * ) = e x − 1, moreover it has exactly one positive solution.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE STACKELBERG APPROACH
This section is dedicated to present some important properties of the Stackelberg equilibrium we derived in the previous section.
A. Spectrum coordination
In this section, we shall first look for what values of channel gains for each of the users there is a possibility that both the leader and the follower use the same carrier. Then, we will compute the probability that there is no coordination between the players.
Proposition 5. The set of g 1 n , . . . , g K n , n = 1, 2 for which there is no coordination between the users (and they both use the same carrier) is a proper subset of the set G 0 of g k n s satisfying:
Note that G 0 is exactly the set of g k 1 s for which there is no coordination in the simultaneousmove game considered in [5] . Thus, introducing hierarchy in the game induces more spectrum coordination than there was in the simultaneous-move scenario.
In the next proposition, we will show that the probability of no coordination between the players is always small and decreases fast as the number of carriers grows.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the channel gains of different players are not correlated. Then the probability that there is no coordination between the players at the Stackelberg equilibrium is bounded above by
where B denotes the Beta function, which is the exact probability of no coordination in the simultaneous-move version of the model. Remark 2. In the above proposition, we assume that the channel gains for different carriers of each of the users are i.i.d. Rayleigh random variables, which is typically the case when the two carriers are far enough [25] . Otherwise, the probability computed there can be treated as an upper bound for respective probabilities, when there is a positive correlation between different carriers of each of the users, which is much more realistic. We will see later in the paper (see Fig. 1 and 2) that, in the case of positive correlation over carriers, these probabilities will be even smaller (and so faster decreasing to 0).
Remark 3. Now, the opposite situation to that analyzed in Prop. 6 is when both users experience the same channel gains. The probability that there is no coordination between the players in the Stackelberg game is then bounded above by
which is still decreasing to 0 as K goes to infinity, but K times bigger than the bound in Eq.
(8). The intuition behind this is that, if the channels of different users are not correlated, then with probability (K − 1)/K users have different best channels and with only 1/K users have the same best channels (and interference is an issue in this case). If users experience the same channel gains, they have the same best channel with probability 1. Also, if the number of carriers K is big, both users will have two best carriers of similar quality as the channel gains are chosen at random, so the probability that they choose the same carrier becomes very small.
B. Payoffs comparison
The leader is not worse off on introducing hierarchy (which is always the case in Stackelberg games if both the leader and the follower use their equilibrium policies), but the follower loses on it in some cases. The proposition below gives more insights on what the latter depends on.
Proposition 7.
For any sigmoidal function f the following three situations are possible:
Then, for both the leader and the follower, the payoff in the simultaneous-move game is the same as in the Stackelberg game.
2) Both players use the same carrier B 1 = B 2 in equilibria (or -equilibria) of simultaneousmove and Stackelberg games. Then, the payoff of the follower in the Stackelberg game is always bigger than that in the simultaneous-move game.
3) B 1 = B 2 and both players change the carriers they use in equilibrium: the leader from S 1 in the simultaneous-move game to B 1 in the Stackelberg game, the follower from B 2 in the simultaneous-move game to S 2 in the Stackelberg game. Then, the payoff of the follower in the Stackelberg game is smaller than that in the simultaneous-move game.
C. Comparison between leading and following
It is known from [21] , that if there is only one carrier available for the players, it is always better to be the follower than to be the leader. The situation changes when the number of carriers increases.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the Stackelberg game has exact equilibria both when player 1 is the leader and when he is the follower. Then, the utility at Stackelberg equilibrium of player 1 if he is the leader is not less than his utility if he is the follower if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
2) B 1 = B 2 and min{
Although the formulation of the proposition is rather complicated, its general meaning is simple.
It states that if best carriers of the players are different or at least one of the players has two good carriers (that is -the second best carrier is not much worse than the best one), then it is profitable to be the leader. If each of the players has only one good carrier and the same for both, their situation reduces to that when only one carrier is available, and so every user can obtain better energy efficient utility by decreasing its priority from leading to following. It is worth noting though that if g k n are i.i.d. Rayleigh variables, one of the two first cases of Proposition 8 will occur with probability significantly bigger than 1 − (1 + γ * )B(1 + γ * , K)
and so it will be very close to 1 even for small values of K.
D. Social welfare comparison
Let us now compute the social welfare in our model as the sum of utilities of both players.
In the following proposition, we give upper bounds on the possible decrease of social welfare when we introduce hierarchy in the game, as well as a bound on the ratio of the maximum social welfare obtainable and that of Stackelberg equilibrium in the game. The latter can be treated as the Price of Anarchy in our game.
Proposition 9. The social welfare when the players apply Stackelberg equilibrium policies equals both maximum social welfare obtainable in the game and social welfare in Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game whenever B 1 = B 2 . When B 1 = B 2 , the social welfare in Stackelberg equilibrium:
1) Is at most
times worse than that in simultaneous-move game equilibrium.
2) Is at most
times worse than the maximum social welfare obtainable in the game.
Note that, when g k n are i.i.d. Rayleigh variables (as it was assumed in Proposition 6), then a) the region where Stackelberg equilibrium is not the social optimum shrinks fast as the number of carriers increases; b) even in case there is no coordination in Stackelberg equilibrium, the ratios appearing in the above proposition are small with probability increasing with the number of carriers.
E. Spectral efficiency
Along with energy efficiency, spectral efficiency -defined as the throughput per unit of bandwidth -is one of the key performance evaluation criteria for wireless network design. These two conflicting criteria can be linked through their tradeoff [26] , [27] . Therefore, it is often imperative to make a tradeoff between energy efficiency and spectral efficiency. In the following, we give a closed-form expression of the lower bound on the sum spectral efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg model. Proposition 10. The spectral efficiency in case there is a coordination between the users at the Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly bigger than
which is equal to the spectral efficiency in the simultaneous-move game.
The computation done in Proposition 10 is done only in case there is coordination between the players. This means that this is only a lower bound for the total spectral efficiency in our model.
However, by Proposition 6, it becomes very tight as K goes to infinity. An easy consequence of this is that the spectral efficiency in the limit model (with an infinite number of carriers) can be computed exactly, and is equal to log 2 (1+γ * ). Notice that, when users experience the same channel gains, the spectral efficiency in case there is a coordination between the users at the Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly bigger than
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider the energy efficiency function, f (x) = (1 − e −x ) M , well-known in power allocation games, where M = 100 is the block length in bits. For this efficiency function, γ * 6.4 (or 8.1 dB). Simulations were carried out using a rate R n = 1 Mbps for n = {1, 2}. We have simulated 10000 scenarios to remove the random effects from Rayleigh fading.
A. The probability of no coordination
Let us first consider a quasi-static correlated Rayleigh-fading channel model. Fig. 1 and 2 reflect the effect of the correlation between different carriers of each of the users on the probability of no coordination for the Stackelberg and the Nash game respectively. The correlation model follows the model [28] . As we expected in Section VI-A, results in Fig. 2 show that, in the case of correlated carriers, the probability of no coordination is smaller and so faster decreasing to 0 even for a moderate number of carriers K.
From now on, we will only consider the case of no correlation between different carriers of each of the users. In case of correlated carriers, performance results obtained in the remainder have to be considered as a worst case performance. Fig. 3 and 4 investigate the effect of the correlation between different users' fading channel on the probability of no coordination for the hierarchical (Stackelberg) and the simultaneous (Nash) game respectively. The correlation factor modelling the dependencies between the users is θ. In both figures, results show that, as the correlation between different users decreases, the probability Fig. 1 . The probability of no coordination between the players at the Nash equilibrium with correlation over carriers. of no coordination gets even smaller and so faster decreasing to 0, which is somehow intuitive.
In order to assess the accuracy of the theoretical bounds, we also plot the simulated probability of no correlation. Fig. 3 shows that the simulated curves of the probability of no coordination at the Nash equilibrium and the theoretical curves in Eq. (8) for i.i.d. users (i.e., for θ = 0) and in Eq. (9) for correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) match pretty well. Now, when we look at the Stackelberg equilibrium in Fig. 4 , it is clearly illustrated that the theoretical upper-bounds derived in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) turn out to be greater than the simulated probabilities of no coordination, which confirms the accuracy of the results. Remember that the theoretical curves derived in Eq.
(8) and Eq. (9) correspond to the exact probability of no coordination in the simultaneous-move game, which is clearly confirmed by Fig. 3 . The probability of no coordination between the players at the Nash equilibrium with correlation over users. Fig. 4 . The probability of no coordination between the players at the Stackelberg equilibrium with correlation over users. Fig. 5 and 6 depict the probability of no coordination for different schemes considering independent users (i.e., for θ = 0) and correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) respectively. Both curves follow the same trend, tending to increase the coordination between the users as the number of carriers grows, which validates the obtained theoretical results. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, at the social optimum, we always obtain strict coordination between users. This means that, in a centralized system, if maximizing the energy efficiency is the goal, introducing hierarchy moves the solution closer to the social optimum.
On the other hand, such an allocation is in stark contrast with that of capacity-maximizing schemes. It is commonly known that maximizing the users' sum capacity leads to a water-filling power allocation [24] , while for multi-cell interfering links, the capacity-optimal power allocation has been shown to be binary [29] . We emphasize that, in the latter both cases, a certain number of carriers are exploited depending on the channel gains, whereas, when we come up to maximize energy efficiency, each user uses only one carrier depending on his fading channel gain and coordination is optimal. To sum it up, we can argue that correlation over carriers is a suitable feature as it brings more coordination (and thus leads to a better spectral efficiency), desirable from the social point of view, while correlation over users is not suited as it increases the probability of no coordination.
This results is of practical interest as it suggests that designing the power control for multi-carrier networks shall be developed tailored to the physical properties of the transmission phenomenon.
B. Energy efficiency
We then resort to plot the average energy efficiency at the equilibrium for increasing number of carriers K. The curves obtained in Fig. 7 for independent users (i.e., for θ = 0) exhibit a different trend than ones in Fig. 8 for correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) . Indeed, we remark that the Stackelberg perform almost the same as the Nash game for θ = 0, whereas, for θ = 1, the gap between the Nash game and the Stackelberg game increases. More specifically, the Stackelberg model achieves an energy efficiency gain up to 25% with respect to the Nash model for K = 4 carriers. As the number of carriers K goes large, both configurations tend towards having the same average energy efficiency. This can be justified by the fact that, when the number of carriers increases, the probability that users are coordinated is high (see Section VI-A) and thus, users are less sensitive to their degree of hierarchy in the system (see Prop. 9). Interestingly, in both the independent and correlated users' cases, the Stackelberg game achieves almost the same energy efficiency as at the social welfare, which tends to validate results in Prop. 9. Fig. 9 illustrates the per-user energy efficiency with independent users. Interestingly, we see from Fig. 9 that, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, the energy efficiency of the follower in the Stackelberg game is smaller than that in the simultaneous-move game. This suggests that, for the vast majority of cases, Situation 3) in Prop. 7 is more likely to occur for a low number of carriers K. As K increases, Situation 1) in Prop. 7 is more likely to occur yielding the same energy efficiency for both the leader and the follower in the Stackelberg game as in the simultaneous-move game. This is justified by the fact that with probability 1/K, resp. (K − 1)/K, users have the same, resp. different, best channels. It is then easy to see that, for low K, users are more likely to have the same best channels and interference is an issue in this case yielding to Situation 3) in Prop. 7, whereas, for sufficiently large K, users are more likely to have different best channels yielding to Situation 1) in Prop. 7. Moreover, Fig. 9 also shows that leading is much better than following which corresponds to what Prop. 8 points out.
C. Spectral efficiency
In Fig. 10 and 11 , we compare the closed-form expressions of the spectral efficiency derived in Eq. (10) for i.i.d. users (i.e., for θ = 0) and in Eq. (11) for correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) with the simulated spectral efficiency. Of particular interest is the fact that the closed-form expressions turn out to be very tight. We can also observe that the Stackelberg game performs better than the Nash game in terms of average spectral efficiency particularly for correlated users while still performing very close to the social welfare. As an example, for K = 2 carriers, the Stackelberg game yields only a negligible spectral efficiency loss 0.05 Mbps/Hz with respect to the social welfare and approximately 0.22 Mbps/Hz of spectral efficiency gain beyond the Nash game.
D. Spectral efficiency -Energy efficiency Tradeoff
In order to illustrate the balance between the achievable rate and energy consumption of the system, we plot in Fig. 12 and 13 the spectral efficiency as a function of the energy efficiency for independent and correlated users respectively. Surprisingly, it is clearly shown that, for both the independent and correlated cases, the proposed Stackelberg decision approach achieves a flexible and desirable tradeoff between energy efficiency and throughput maximization compared to the social welfare and the Nash model. In particular, it is shown that the Stackelberg scheme maximizes the energy efficiency while still optimizing the spectral efficiency at the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Notice that this contrasts with most related works so far in which the optimal energy efficiency performance often leads to low spectral efficiency performance and vice versa [30] - [35] . This feature has a great impact on the network performance and provides a convincing argument that hierarchical communication is the proper context to design and optimize energy efficient wireless networks. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The growing interest in energy efficient research from signal processing and communication communities has spurred an increasing interest in the recent years. There have been a large number of proposals for all communication layers, but the system infrastructure has not been clearly defined. In this paper, we have proposed a hierarchical game to model distributed joint power and channel allocation for multi-carrier energy efficient systems since it has the advantage of leading towards more realistic or even simpler distributed power control algorithms. We have established the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and gave its formal expression. The proposed scheme achieves better performances as compared to those of other existing schemes, notably the Nash model proposed in [5] . In particular, we have proved that introducing hierarchy across users induces a spectrum coordination which substantially improves system performances.
For the first time, we have derived the spectral efficiency of such a model with exact expressions for the throughput scaling. The proposed scheme can achieve a spectral efficiency scaling of
, while a vanishing fraction of the carriers may suffer from mutual interference as the number of the carriers goes large. Simulation results have been presented to exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed scheme to balance the achievable rate and energy consumption of the system. Furthermore, we have found several key differences between related works and ours:
• Contrary to the work addressed in [5] , by introducing hierarchy to multi-carrier systems, we always obtain an equilibrium. Interestingly, we have shown that, although we have considered that each user is prone to interference from the other transmitter on the same carrier, for the vast majority of cases, there exists a natural coordination pattern where users have incentive to choose their transmitting carriers orthogonally (like in OFDMA systems). The proposed system goes toward the vision of a fully coordinated multi-carrier wireless network, whereby transmit powers are coordinated across the users,
• It is well known that capacity-based approaches lead to a water-filling solution [24] where more power is allocated if channel is good and less power is allocated if the channel is bad. Inversely, Prop. 3 points out that, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, energy efficient-based approaches lead to a channel inversion power allocation in which more, resp. less, power is allocated when the channel is bad, resp. good to compensate for fading channel,
• We have proved that, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, each of the two users transmits on only one carrier depending on their fading channel gains. Again, this contrasts with capacity-based approaches in which only a certain number of carriers is exploited depending on the channel gains. As an example, for the multi-cell interfering links, the capacity-optimal power allocation has been shown to be binary [29] , while maximizing the single-user system with parallel additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels is water-filling power allocation [36] . In particular, when the SNR is low, resp. high, only one, resp. every, carrier is exploited. Energy efficiency, on the other hand, is always maximized by using a single carrier. This means that each of the users always leaves K − 1 carriers completely idle,
• As opposed to [21] (which studies single carrier hierarchical games), we have shown that, when we come up to study multi-carrier hierarchical games, the degree of freedom increases and leading becomes better than following,
• We have shown that the proposed Stackelberg decision approach maximizes the energy efficiency while still optimizing the spectral efficiency at the Stackelberg equilibrium which is in contrast with most related works so far in which the optimal energy efficiency performance often leads to low spectral efficiency performance and vice versa,
• Though traditionally considered as undesirable for wireless networks, we have proved, in this paper, that correlation can be a well-suited feature for multi-carrier energy efficient systems.
Indeed, while correlation over users is not suited as it leads to less coordination, we have also seen that correlation across carriers brings more coordination over the system (and thus leads to better performances). On the other hand, it is widely admitted that the nature of the energy-radiating physical phenomenon constitutes correlation across carriers while the degree of correlation may vary according to the variation characteristics of the transmission phenomenon [25] . This suggests that the network planning and design phase should rather exploit carrier correlation by allocating very close carriers to users as channel characteristics are likely to be similar (and this goes also for each user's best carriers).
The above discussions make a compelling case for placing emphasis on developing future multicarrier wireless networks and designing communication protocols which exploit the advantageous intrinsic features of the hierarchical communication paradigm.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1. For any finite sequence of n pairs (a n , b n ) such that a n ≥ 0 and b n > 0 the following inequality is true: n n=1 a n n n=1 b n ≤ max{ a n b n , n = 1, . . . , n}.
The equality is only possible if each ratio an bn is equal.
Proof:
We proceed by induction with respect to n. For n = 2 we have let us assume that the hypothesis is not true and thus:
This can be rewritten as
which is a contradiction.
Next, assume that our hypothesis is true for any k < n. Then, we can proceed as follows:
n n=1 a n n n=1 b n ≤ n−1 n=1 a n + a n n−1
If there is at least one pair (a n , b n ), whose ratio is bigger than the other ones we can show along the same lines that the inequality is strong (we only need to take these a n and b n from the sums n n=1 a n , n n=1 b n in the above considerations instead of a n and b n . Now we can prove Proposition 2.
Proof: Note that by Lemma 1
, so the leader in the Stackelberg game will always choose only one carrier for whicĥ
(where p 2 is computed according to (3) ) is the greatest. Note however that since the follower will chose only one carrier,f
only for one carrier, say carrier k * , and for any other carrier it will be equal to
, which is maximized for p
and then equal to
But this last value depends on the carrier only through g k 1 , so will be maximized for k = B 1 if only k * = B 1 . Thus the equilibrium strategy of the leader will put all the power on carrier B 1 in that case. If k * = B 1 , then the biggest value off k 1 (p k 1 ) for k = k * will be for k = S 1 , and either all the power of the leader will be put on this carrier or on k * = B 1 .
As for the follower, by Proposition 1 his best response is always to put all his power on the carrier maximizingĥ
, which will be equal to g k 2 σ 2 for all but one carrier. Now the reasoning made for the leader can be applied here as well.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: First consider the case when B 1 = B 2 . The biggest possible value of the ratio f (γ k n ) p k n obtainable for player n on a single carrier (when his opponent does not maximize his payoff, but also the payoff of player n) is
Just this is obtained by both players when they apply strategies p n defined in the theorem. Thus none of them will be interested in changing his strategy. Now we move to the case when B 1 = B 2 . Suppose the leader uses only carrier B 1 in his equilibrium strategy. Then, by Proposition 2 the follower uses one of carriers B 1 = B 2 or S 2 . If he uses B 1 then by Proposition 1 the following has to be true:
Rewriting this we obtain that the follower chooses B 1 when
(12) and S 2 otherwise. Having this in mind, we can compute that the utility at equilibrium of the leader using carrier B 1 will be
and f (
otherwise. Next we need to find the values of p (13) and (14) respectively. Before we obtain the first one we rewrite the SINR in that case in the following way:
and differentiate it with respect to p B 1 1 , obtaining:
Next, we can transform (15) into
and put it into (16), obtaining:
Now we write the first order condition for the maximization of (13):
If we substitute (18) into it, we obtain the following equation:
If we find the best solution to this equation (that is, maximizing
), β * , we get the power allocation of the leader in case (12) , which can be computed from (17) as
Similarly, when we write the first order condition for the maximization of (14), we obtain 0 = ∂(
whose unique solution is γ * . The corresponding value of p
Now, we put (20) and (21) in (13) and (14) respectively, obtaining the value functions corresponding to p * and p * * :
Note that the first one is always bigger than the second one (because γ * maximizes the ratio
and γ * , β * > 0), so in case p * satisfies the condition opposite to (12) , the leader will choose to 28 transmit on B 1 with this power, while the follower will choose (according to (1) on carrier B 1 , which now gives the biggest value in case the follower chooses to use carrier S 2 ,
or to choose to use his second-best carrier S 1 instead of B 1 , with power
, which would give him the value
Choosing the biggest one from V B 1 , W B 1 and U S 1 will give the leader's equilibrium payoff (and corresponding equilibrium strategy) in the Stackelberg game, unless V B 1 is not the biggest value obtainable by the leader in case (12) . This is only possible when the biggest value of (13) is obtained on one of the ends of the interval (0,γ 1+γ * (1+γ) ]. Thus, we compute these two values: for n = 1, 2 (which is an exact condition for no coordination in the simultaneous-move model).
The probability of this can be computed as
H. Proof of Proposition 9
Proof: The first part of the proposition is obvious. To prove 1) of the second part first note that the social welfare in equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game can only be bigger than that in Stackelberg equilibrium when the payoff of the follower in the Stackelberg game decreases. This is only possible when the carrier he uses in equilibrium changes from B 1 = B 2 in the simultaneousmove game to S 2 in the Stackelberg game. In such a case his utility changes from f (γ * )g in the latter one (this is because this is his utility in Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, and the utility of the leader increases in Stackelberg game). Straightforward computations yield the desired bound on the decrease of social welfare.
To prove part 2) first note that the maximum utility that can be obtained in this game is bounded above by f (γ * )g
as this is the sum of maximal utilities of both players (but not obtainable at the same time if times less than (28) .
I. Proof of Proposition 10
Proof: No coordination in the simultaneous-move game is possible exactly when B 1 = B 2 and g Bn n ≥ (1 + γ * )g Sn n for n = 1, 2. 1 minus the exact probability of that region is computed in Proposition 6, and this is also the lower bound on the same probability for the Stackelberg game.
The spectral efficiency in case there is coordination between the players can be computed as the expected value of log 2 (1 + γ) over this region. Note however that γ ≡ γ * there, and so the bound on spectral efficiency is exactly log 2 (1 + γ * ) times (the bound on) the probability of coordination, which is 1 − (1 + γ * )B(1 + γ * , K)
